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TAKING LAWS SERIOUSLY
Aleksander Peczenikt
What is "valid law"? The natural law tradition and legal positiv-
ism offer different answers to this question. According to the natural
law tradition, immoral laws are not binding because the law derives va-
lidity either from natural law or from morality. This viewpoint also
assumes that natural law is rationally cognizable. I The "valid law" con-
cept requires a relationship between the law and the rationally cogniza-
ble natural law. Legal positivists, on the other hand, claim that law
might be immoral and yet legally valid.2 According to legal positivists,
a fundamental test of "valid law" exists, which presupposes a relation-
ship between the law and some social facts. For example, the law de-
rives its validity either because the sovereign power can enforce its
commands, or because the masses accept it.
Ronald Dworkin criticizes legal positivism, but without joining the
central tradition of natural law. He points out that in addition to legal
rules, there are legal principles, 3 which, although not enacted in any
sources of the law, nevertheless bind judges.
[Legal rules] are valid because some competent institution enacted
them ... [b]ut this test of pedigree will not work for . . . principles.
The origin of. . . legal principles lies not in a particular decision of
t Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Lund. I am most grateful to many col-
leagues for extensive discussions and criticism, particularly Aulis Aarnio and Robert S. Sum-
mers. I did much of the work for this article from January through August 1981, while I held
a fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies and lectured at the Cornell Law
School. I wish to acknowledge indebtedness to the professors and students of Cornell Univer-
sity for valuable discussions.
I E.g., P. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW (1951); L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW
(1969); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Repy to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630
(1958).
2 Eg., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1981); N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REA-
SONING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978); Hart, Positivism And The Separation of Law And Morals, 71
HARv. L. REV. 593 (1958).
3 "Rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are
given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it
is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision." R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 24 (1977). Principles, however, differ. "A principle like 'No man may profit from
his own wrong' . . . states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a
particular decision." Id at 26; see also id at 71-80 (Dworkin reaffirms distinction in response
to Raz, Legal Princzbles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 829-38 (1972)); cf. N.K.
SUNDBY, OM NORMER 190-204 (1974) (guiding standards (retningslinjer, Richtlinien)). This
distinction has many other definitions. See, e.g., Alexy, Zum Begrfdes Rechtspiznps, 1 REcHT-
STHEORIE BEIHEFr 63 (1979). A rule, for example, can be either fulfilled or violated, tertium
non datur, and a principle can be fulfilled to a certain degree, more or less. Id at 79-80.
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some legislature or court, but in a sense of appropriateness developed
in the profession and the public over time.
4
Individuals observe a principle "because it is a requirement of justice or
fairness or some other dimension of morality." 5
Dworkin simultaneously points out that legal principles require "a
good fit" with "institutional history. ' 6 "[N]o principle can count as a
justification of institutional history unless it provides a certain threshold
adequacy of fit, though amongst those principles that meet this test of
adequacy the morally soundest must be preferred."' 7 On this ground,
Dworkin launches "a general attack on positivism,"8 especially on its
assumption that the "law of a community is a set of special rules [that]
can be identified. . . by tests having to do not with their content but
with their pedigree. "9 "Positivism . . . is a model of and for a system of
rules, and its central notion of a single fundamental test for law forces us
to miss the important roles"' 0 of principles. Dworkin, in particular, at-
tacks H.L.A. Hart's position that each community developed its own
rule of recognition, a "fundamental secondary" rule that establishes how
legal rules will be identified."
Several commentators have criticized Dworkin's views and have ar-
gued that one must apply a fundamental test of law to distinguish legal
from nonlegal principles. 12 Dworkin responds to the criticism by argu-
ing that it is not true that
some social rule or set of social rules exists within the community of its
judges and legal officials, which rules settle the limits of the judge's
duty to recognize any other rule or principle as law.' 3
The social rule theory fails because it insists that a practice must
somehow have the same content as the rule that individuals assert in its
name. But if we suppose simply that a practice may justify a rule,
then while the rule so justified may have the same content as the prac-
tice, it may not; it may fall short of, or go beyond it. 14
Moral reasoning bridges the gap between social practice and the
4 R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 40. Dworkin leaves unanswered the question of
whether this difference of origin necessarily follows the semantical difference described in note
3.
5 Id at 22; cf R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 56 (rev. ed.
7th printing 1965).
6 R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 340.
7 Id at 342.
8 Id. at 22.
9 Id at 17.
10 Id at 22.
"1 Id at 21; see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-107 (1961) (defining rule of
recognition).
12 See, e.g., N. MACCORMICK, supra note 2, at 238; Sartorius, Socal Policy and LegalJuslfl-
cation, 8 AM. PHIL. Q. 151, 155 (1971).
13 R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 59-60.
14 Id at 58 (emphasis in original).
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processes of justification and identification of legal principles. The re-
quirement of moral reasoning makes the fundamental-test-of-law idea
unacceptable to Dworkin. Judges, according to Dworkin, do not merely
apply an established test of law. They, instead, use their moral sense of
appropriateness tojustiy some principles; principles so justified are prin-
ciples of law. References to established social practices are merely part
of this justificatory reasoning.15
Are these principles identifiable by morality alone and not by pedi-
gree?1 6 Dworkin apparently requires a combination of both. Moral ap-
propriateness is a necessary but not sufficient condition of legally valid
principles; institutional "pedigree" is another.17 The overall character
of legal justification, however, is morally evaluative rather than institu-
tionally descriptive.
The primary objective of this article is to discuss the relationship
between legal and moral justifications. I will contrast my theory with
that of Ronald Dworkin.' 8
I
DISTINGUISHING THE CONTEXTUALLY SUFFICIENT FROM
THE DEEP JUSTIFICATION
Simultaneous acceptance of moral and descriptive justifications
gives rise to a serious analytical problem. How can a justification be
moral overall if it involves descriptive components? The descriptive
components affct the overall character of the normal, contextually suffi-
cient legal justification. The contextually sufficient justification is more
than a conglomerate of moral and descriptive components. In fact, even
the evaluative components are not identical with ordinary moral reason-
ing. Dworkin overlooks this discrepancy.
If a theory of law is to provide a basis for judicial duty, then the prin-
ciples it sets out must try tojustifi the settled rules by identifying the
15 See Id at 61-64.
16 "Pedigree," to Dworkin, is the test of law which examines the propriety of its enact-
ment and the validity of the institutions giving rise to it. This test, distinguishing valid legal
rules from spurious ones, is based not on their content but on the manner in which they were
adopted or developed. Id at 17.
17 This conclusion follows also from Dworkin's reference to the sense of appropriateness
developed in the legal profession. Id at 40. One cannot define the legal profession without
referring to some factual criteria. One cannot, for example, identify "judges" without refer-
ring to their "pedigree," that is to the fact that they have been appointed or elected by legal
procedure regulated by legal rules.
18 A word of warning against philosophical dogmatism is in order here. Dworkin and
natural law proponents seem to assume that all people in all reasonable interpretations use
the concept "valid law" in a manner that presupposes a given relation between "the law" and
morality or natural law. Legal positivists seem to assume that all people in all reasonable
interpretations use the concept "valid law" in a manner that indicates a relationship between
the law and some social facts. Such presuppositions, however, are applicable only to some
people in some contexts. Some people, for example, accept, and others reject, the thesis that
if N is valid law then N cannot be entirely immoral. Legal positivism, natural law, and
Dworkin's theory seem to be too strong.
[Vol. 68:660
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political or moral concerns and traditions of the community which, in
the opinion of the lawyer whose theory it is, do in fact support the
rules. This process of justification must carry the lawyer very deep
into political and moral theory.' 9
This process, however, need not carry the lawyer deep into moral
reasoning. One must distinguish between the contextually sufficient
and the deep justification in the law.20 The contextually sufficient legal
justification is based on the established tradition of legal thinking. Ex-
cept in extraordinarily "hard" cases, lawyers rightly rely upon this tradi-
tion. While they may supplement it with their own moral evaluations,
they may not doubt it. A lawyer, for example, would lose his profes-
sional reputation if he asked the Swedish or United States Supreme
Court why lawyers should follow the Constitution. However, if one
wishes to convince a nonjuristic audience of moralists, philosophers, or
political opponents who question the entire legal tradition, the deep jus-
tification must support the contextually sufficient legal justification.
Dworkin presents an outstanding theory of the deep legal justification
but no satisfactory theory of the contextually sufficient legal justifica-
tion. I will attempt to show that reasoning "by pedigree" or "institu-
tional history" plays a greater role in the latter than in the former.2 1
A. The Three-Step Theory of Legal Justification
Any theory of legal justification must comport with the descriptive
sociology of legal reasoning. When applying the contextually sufficient
19 R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 67 (emphasis in original).
20 This terminology was suggested by Robert S. Summers.
21 Another kind of criticism is also applicable. According to Professor Lyons,
Dworkin's error can be understood as follows. He sees correctly that
positivists regard social facts, such as the facts of official practice, as the
ultimate determinants of law. He then assumes that positivists would
restrict officials, in deciding upon the authoritative tests for law, to crite-
ria that themselves incorporate such social facts about accepted practices
.... That may be true of Austin, but it is not true of Hart, nor is it
essential to the tradition. In Hart's theory, the social facts that ulti-
mately determine law are facts about official practice, but the tests for
law are whatever officials make them.
Lyons, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 415, 425 (1977). Lyons thus saves legal positivism by
moving it from the level ofjudicial thinking to a metalevel of thinking about judicial thinking.
Judges might behave as Dworkin claims they do, but a legal positivist is not a judge, he is a
theorist using the judge's practice as the test of law. This use of a metalevel is a standard tool
of legal realists. See Aarnio, Alexy & Peczenik, The Foundation of Legal Reasoning, 12 REcHTS-
THEORIE 133, 148 (1981).
Dworkin, of course, would not approve of this move. Dworkin claims that he does not
view judges from the outside but that he formulates a theory from their perspective "to pro-
vide a basis for judicial duty." R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 67; see also Oker-Blom, En enda
riktig losning trots allt?-Dworkin mot fnlandsk bakgrtnd, TIDSKRIFT UTGIVEN AV JURIDISKA
F6RENINGEN I FINLAND 251, 306, 312 (1978).
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and the deep justifications, jurists assume the distinctions amongst three
different stages involved in legal justification:22 first, establishing the
law-character of a normative system as a whole; second, establishing the
legal validity of the sources of law in a given legal system; and third,
establishing the content of legal norms (rules and principles). 23
Each stage requires application of socially established criteria
("tests") and evaluative ("moral" sensu largo)24 justification. The rela-
tionship between the law and evaluative justification is necessary to pre-
serve the concepts of "a legal system," "a legal source," and "legal
justification. '25 The relative importance of the established criteria is
greatest in the first stage, while the relative importance of evaluations is
greatest in the third.26
B. Legal System, Legal Sources, and Legal Interpretation
This section contains more information than may be necessary for
purely analytical purposes. The reader, therefore, should pay less atten-
tion to the details of the description than to the idea that the stages of
legal justification differ greatly from one another. Moral justification, in
particular, plays a different role in each stage. Few moral evaluations
are required to identify which normative system, as a whole, constitutes
the valid law of a given territory.
The law-character of a normative system is characterized by the
presence of the following social facts. The system is essentially hierarchi-
cal; higher norms determine the proper method of creating lower
22 Jurists in the Continental (European) tradition assume these distinctions which Brit-
ish and American philosophies of the law often ignore.
23 The contextually sufficient legal justification focuses on the second and third stages; it
assumes the deep justification of the first stage.
24 These evaluations are moral sensu largo because their task is to establish standards of
action that account for the interests of others. They are not moral sensu stricto because legal
criteria and legal-reasoning norms restrict them and because they are not used in free moral
discourse. Some of these evaluations are also moral in the unusual, but possible, sense ascrib-
able to Dworkin, that "moral" means "related to rights." See infra notes 52-61 and accompa-
nying text.
25 The absence of this relationship would change these concepts because many causal
relations between the law and morality are present. Moreover, there is a derivative link be-
tween the law and morality. Even if the law is defined by reference to its nonmoral proper-
ties, these nonmoral properties give it, of necessity, moral worth. Set J. RAZ, PRACTICAL
REASONS AND NORMS 166 (1975). Dworkin would probably accept both this weak concep-
tual relation between the law and morality and the weak relations I discuss in this section. It
is uncertain, however, which stronger relations he would accept. See Mackie, The Third Theoy
of Law, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 3, 6 (1977). One commentator attributes to Dworkin the
thesis that immoral rules cannot be laws. Blackstone, Law and Morality: The Hart-Dworkin De-
bate andAn Alternative, 11 ARSP BEIHEi-r NEUE FOLGE (IVR X) 77, 85. This strong interpre-
tation of Dworkin's theory, however, is difficult to reconcile with his distinction between
institutional and background moral rights. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 326.
26 A possible explanation for the differing weights is that one easily accepts established
criteria of law because they are vague and abstract (stage 1), but insists that the concrete content of
the law (stage 3) be better adapted to moral considerations.
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norms.27 Moreover, the norms of this system, for the most part, are
observed. Some norms impose sanctions-usually enforced by a force-
exercising organization-on violators.28 By sanctioning diversions from
societal norms, the legal system indirectly controls the society as a
whole. The legal system claims to be the supreme system of norms in
society;29 it claims the sole right to exercise force in its territory;30 and it
claims authority to regulate behavior.3' The normative system is char-
acterized by lawyers using technical methods, who frequently interpret
statutes and judicial decisions. Moreover, the law is relatively precise,
general, of longstanding duration, and possesses a high degree of institti-
tionalization. 32 Because of these characteristics citizens recognize its au-
thority. The law is necessary in understanding such human actions as
selling things, forming organizations, committing crimes, etc.33
In ordinary situations, these characteristics are sufficient to estab-
lish the law-character of a normative system. No sane person, for exam-
ple would doubt that either Swedish or United States law as a whole
constitutes a legal system. In extraordinary situations, however, such
characteristics provide an insufficient basis from which to conclude that
the normative system in question is a legal system; in such a situation,
one must choose whether to regard the system as a legal system. This
problem occurs when the normative system embodies many attributes of
law, yet is extremely immoral-for example, Hitler's or Pol Pot's "law."
Personal gains may determine the choice,34 but they do not justify it.
One can still justify the choice with evaluative reasons, assuming that
the normative system is legal only if it neither contains nor generates too
many grossly immoral norms or practices.3 5
Although these criteria of law are neither simple nor sufficient to
establish the law-character of a normative system as a whole, they con-
stitute an important component of the complex reasoning process which
supports the idea that a normative system is a legal system. Moral rea-
soning sensu largo is another component necessary only in extraordinary
situations. Anyone who argues that a given situation is extraordinary in
this sense has the burden ofjustifying his thesis.36 Furthermore, whether
27 See H. KFLSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE 228-30 (1960).
28 Id at 34-36. K. OLIVECRONA, LAW AS FACr 171-80 (1939), 271-73 (2d ed. 1971).
29 See J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 118 (1979).
30 See A. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 34 (1958).
31 See J. RAZ, supra note 29, at 119.
32 See J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 218 (1980) ("definition, specific-
ity, clarity and thus predictability"); cf. V. Black, Report for II International Congress of
Legal Science, Amsterdam (Sept. 1980).
33 See H. KELSEN, supra note 27, at 3-4.
34 S. STROMHOLM, RATT, RATTSKALLOR OCH RATTSTILLAMPNING 38 (1981).
35 See J. LUCAS, ON JUSTICE 123 (1980) ("lex iniustissima non est lex').
36 See R. ALEXY, THEORIE DER JURISTISCHEN ARGUMENTATION 242-45 (1978)
(Argumentationslast).
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the total normative system of a given territory constitutes the legal sys-
tem is an important question to philosophers, moralists, or politicians,
but rarely troubles lawyers. The question belongs to the deep justifica-
tion, not to the contextually sufficient legal justification. 3 7
Moral reasoning sensu largo plays a greater, but still limited, role in
establishing the legal validity of the sources of law in a given legal sys-
tem. The expression "sources of law" is ambiguous. In the broadest
sense, all legal reasons are sources of law. In a more narrow sense, insti-
tutional legal-authority reasons38 are sources of law. Finally, in the nar-
rowest sense, mandatory sources-those that a lawyer "must" or
"should" rely upon-are sources of law. The highest norms of a legal
system, for example, the norms of its constitution, are certainly legiti-
mate legal sources. To validate other sources of law, both constitutional
authorization and additional "source-norms" which lawyers accept are
required. 39 These norms determine the material one must, should, or
may cite in judicial decisions that address legal questions. Swedish law
presents an opportunity to examine some source norms of this kind.40
Under Swedish law, all courts and authorities must use statutes, if
any are applicable, to justify their decisions; they should use applicable
precedents and legislative histories to justify their decisions; and they
may use,4 I among other things, custom, repealed statutes, foreign laws,
and professional legal literature to justify their decisions.
The identification of a concrete material* as a source of the law,
however, is not always free of value judgments. In some "hard" cases,
because the established source norms and criteria fail to solve the prob-
lem of identification, one must rely upon moral reasoning to decide
whether a given material is a source of the law and, if so, to which class
of sources it belongs. The concept of the "sources of the law" would
change if one eliminated its evaluative openness and instead established
criteria entirely free of value judgments to determine what is and is not
a legal source. This concept, however, would also change if one elimi-
nated the source norms and criteria, thereby making the identification
of the sources totally a matter of judgment. Identification of the sources,
after all, might in some cases simply follow from a combination of the
constitution, the source norms, and established criteria.
Moral reasoning sensu largo is most influential in establishing the
content of legal norms (rules and principles). Dworkin's theory is easily
37 See A. PECZENIK, THE BASIS OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 13 (1983).
38 Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theog of Common-Lawjsq fica-
tion, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 707 (1978).
39 See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
40 A. PECZENIK, JURIDIKENS METODPROBLEM 48-53 (1980).
41 Courts may also rely on precedents and legislative materials that do not directly ad-
dress the legal text in question but give information on evaluations in adjacent or analogous
areas of law.
[Vol. 68:660
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applied to this problem. Moral reasoning must, however, be substanti-
ated with references to the sources of the law. In the process of legal
justification, the institutionalized sources of the law and the moral eval-
uations of the person performing the justification adapt to each other.
Moreover, the justifier adapts the sources of the law to each other,
thereby making them more consistent with each other than they would
otherwise be. This two-step process of adaptation is bound, to some ex-
tent, by traditionally established reasoning norms implicit in legislative,
judicial, and juristic practice. Use of a systematic and explanatory the-
ory will reveal these reasoning norms. Although theory-laden and mor-
ally acceptable, these norms are, in a sense, social, that is, detectable by
their social "pedigree"; their role in social practice.
An examination of Swedish legal thinking reveals, for example,
that the following reasoning norms are implicit and acceptable. First, if
a statute uses different words, one should assume that they relate to dif-
ferent situations, unless there are strong indications to the contrary.
Second, only essential similarities between cases justify applying statutes
by analogy, that is, applying a statutory rule to a case which technically
is not covered by the language of the particular statute. Third, only
very strong reasons justify reasoning by analogy to conclude that an er-
ror exists in the text of the statute. Fourth, a conflict among legal norms
should be resolved either by reinterpreting the norms, or by ranking
them. Fifth, when an earlier norm is incompatible with a later one, the
later one should apply. Sixth, general norms should control only in
cases not covered by more specific norms.
Reasoning norms, as a kind of legal principle, are useful not only in
interpreting legal rules, but also in interpreting legal p'ncifiles. Reason-
ing norms are embedded in legal practice, continually modified, and
remade ad hoc to fit moral opinions generated in a Dworkinian manner
by those who perform the legal justification function. Reasoning norms
are vague, ambiguous, and open to evaluation.42 They do not solve par-
ticularly "hard" cases of legal interpretation; they apply only in situa-
tions where the statute does not expressly forbid them. Even then they
may be disregarded only if important reasons for doing so exist.
Whether or not to apply reasoning norms in concrete cases requires that
one make a creative moral decision.
C. Which Principles Are Principles of Law?
Dworkin asserts that a legal principle must both fulfill the require-
ments of morality and provide a "good fit" with "institutional his-
tory."'43 This formulation can be improved upon. Initially, "the sources
42 See also Alexy, Die Logische AnalyseJuristischer Enscheidungen, 14 ARSP BEIHEir NEUE
FOLGE 181, 190 (1980).
43 R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 340; see supra text accompanying note 6.
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of the law"-the traditional jurisprudential terminology-should re-
place "institutional history." Next, instead of using the words "good
fit," one should address the complex system of legal-reasoning norms
that warrant adapting the content of the law to the legal sources. Fi-
nally, one should address the different roles that "pedigree" and moral-
ity play in establishing the law-character of the norm system as a whole,
the sources of the law, and the content of legal norms.44
What is the precise role of legalprinczbles in this context? They are
connected with the legal-reasoning norms in two ways. First, they re-
flect the "sense of appropriateness developed in the (legal) profession
and the public over time."'45 To know what moral principle is a princi-
ple of law, therefore, requires that the individuals belonging to the legal
profession be identifiable. The identification process, in turn, requires
reference to the legal sources and rules, and thus to the legal-reasoning
norms upon which the interpretation of sources and rules is based. Sec-
ond, legal principles must be constantly adapted to the interpretation of
legal rules, and vice versa. They should be consistent and, to some ex-
tent, support each other. In this manner, all three stages of the legal
justification of rules will affect the content of the principles.
How does our model apply to the controversy between Dworkin
and legal positivists? According to Dworkin, a legal principle must ful-
fill requirements of morality and provide a "good fit" with "institutional
history."'46 Because Dworkin does not intend to reduce all law to princi-
ples, he must acknowledge two classes of legal norms: rules, identifiable
mainly by reference to factual criteria, and principles, identifiable by
moral considerations combined with factual criteria. Many legal posi-
44 See supra notes 22-42 and accompanying text. Our model is richer than Dworkin's.
Because it can solve a greater number of problems, it embodies scientific progress in the sense
that such progress means creating new theories that can say things the older theories could
not. Cf Aarnio, On the Paradigm Articulation in Legal Research, 3 REcHTSTHEORIE BEIHEI-rT 45,
56 (1981).
Dworkin might answer that our distinctions are fictitious. No one performs legal justifi-
cation in six distinct steps: (1) following the criteria of law, (2) adapting them to morality,
(3) following the source norms, (4) adapting them to morality, (5) interpreting the sources,
and (6) adapting them to morality. All these operations certainly are intertwined and re-
peated many times.
[T]o understand law we have first to take a crude statement of all the rules in
the statute book and all the precedents in the case books; then inquire into the
motivating principles and values . .. ; then in the light of that modify our
initial crude grasp . .. , and so on until we reach . . . "reflective
equilibrium."
N. MACCORMICK, supra note 2, at 245. Our distinctions, however, are an idealized model of
legal justification. All idealized models must be corrected by innumerable auxiliary hypothe-
ses, but without idealized models science could not exist. To reject this model would be
similar to rejecting a ballistic theory because it cannot foresee the exact movement of a missile
in the air and must be corrected by considerations concerning friction.
45 R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 40.
46 R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 340; see also supra text accompanying note 6.
[Vol. 68:660
TAKING LAWS SERIOUSLY
tivists agree.4 7 Dworkin, however, attributes to legal positivists the false
thesis that all legal norms are identifiable solely by factual criteria. Simi-
larly, when legal positivists discuss Dworkin's theory, they attribute to
Dworkin the false thesis that legal norms are identifiable solely by moral
considerations and then refute the thesis. Examples of such misunder-
standing abound.48
Dworkin's language is too simple. It permits one to emphasize
either the role of moral considerations or the role of the factual criteria.
Emphasizing the former provokes accusations of ignoring factual crite-
ria, while emphasizing the latter provokes accusations of ignoring mo-
rality. Our model, on the other hand, permits precise statements of
what functions the moral considerations and factual criteria have in es-
tablishing the law-character of the norm system as a whole, the sources
of the law, and the content of legal norms. A controversy between
Dworkin and the legal positivists arises because the relative importance
of moral considerations is greatest with respect to the content of legal
norms49 and the relative importance of factual criteria is greatest with
respect to the law-character of the norm system. 50 Dworkin primarily
addresses the third stage and apparently minimizes the importance of fac-
tual criteria,5' while the legal positivists primarily address the first and
second stages and apparently minimize the importance of moral consider-
ations. If Dworkin and the legal positivists accepted our more sophisti-
cated model, a major part of the controversy would disappear.
47 E.g., N. MACCORMICK, supra note 2, at 233. A sophisticated legal positivist, Mac-
Cormick "thunderously proclaims [that] the law is not value free." He recognizes the impor-
tance of either "moral principles" or "principles" and emphasizes the point that "[t]he rules
which are rules oflaw are so in virtue of their pedigree; the principles which are principles of
law are so because of their function in relation to those rules." Id. Dworkin would answer
that this relation is not one of criteria, but one of moral justification. He would assert that it
is not true that legal principles must merely fulfill the factual criteria of law established in the
rules; instead, the relation to rules must be considered when performing moral reasoning to
identify the principles of law. MacCormick would probably agree. He would nevertheless
also note that this relationship with rules dominates in this reasoning process, while the evalu-
ative component is less important. The expanded model permits a more sophisticated expla-
nation. The importance of the relationship between rules and principles varies at different
stages of legal justification.
48 Cf Ten, The Soundest Theogy of Law, 88 MIND 522, 537 (1979) ("[A]lthough it is certain
that Dworkin strongly disagrees with the legal positivists, it is not as yet clear whether they
should disagree with him.").
49 See supra text accompanying note 42.
50 See supra text accompanying notes 27-37.
51 But cf R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 326. To some extent, Dworkin is aware of these
distinctions. He states:
the judge . . . is faced with a familiar sort of conflict: the institutional right
provides a genuine reason, the importance of which will vary with the general
justice or wickedness of the system as a whole, for a decision one way, but
certain considerations of morality present an important reason against it.
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II
JUDICIAL DUTY TO FOLLOW MORAL PRINCIPLES: THE
"RIGHTS THESIS"
The controversy between Dworkin and the legal positivists is even
more complex because it involves a normative element: the judicial duty
to follow moral principles. Legal positivism, according to Dworkin,
maintains that "[t]o say that someone has a 'legal obligation' is to say
that his case falls under a valid legal rule that requires him to do or to
forbear from doing something. . . . In the absence of such a valid legal
rule there is no 'legal obligation' . ,",152 It follows that when a judge
decides a case that is not governed by a valid legal rule, the judge exer-
cises his discretion. He has no legal obligation to decide the case in any
particular manner, because "he is simply not bound by standards set by
the authority in question. '53
Dworkin refutes this thesis. He argues that "[i]n most hard cases
,judges take [a] different posture. . . .They frame their disagree-
ment as a disagreement about what standards they are forbidden or
obliged to take into account, or what relative weights they are obliged to
attribute to these. . . -54 In their reasoning, judges heed both reasons
of authority and moral principles. Judges regard themselves as bound-
and according to Dworkin are, in fact, bound-by principles that can-
not be discovered solely by "pedigree." The principles that bind judges,
instead are justified by a complex reasoning process that seeks a "reflec-
tive equilibrium" of the sources of the law,55 traditional reasoning
norms,5 6 and moral considerations.
Dworkin's argument, however, presents some philosophical
problems. Assume, for example, that on Monday a judge begins an
evaluative, moral, reasoning process that will not result in a formulated
principle until Friday. The judge is bound on Monday, according to
Dworkin's thesis, to follow his as yet unformulated principle. Evalua-
tive, moral thinking gives the judge cognition of his preexisting duty.
Another thesis of Dworkin-his "rights thesis"-asserts that "judicial
decisions enforce existing political rights." 57 Moral principles, not poli-
cies, typically justify judicial decisions in "hard" cases.5 8 The morally
52 Id at 17.
53 Id at 32.
54 Id at 71.
55 Yet, the courts are not legalo bound when they rely on entirely "sourceless" consider-
ations. Cf Raz, Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps, in LAW AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIETY 197,
202 (1979) ("When an action is neither legally prohibited nor legally permitted there is a
legal gap."); Wellman, Moral Judgments, Judicial Decisions and the Law, IVR World Con-
gress (1979) (Paper No. 092).
56 See supra text accompanying notes 27-42.
57 R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 87, 31-35, 68-71, 82-90.
58 Id at 96-97.
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justified principles "are propositions that describe rights."5 9 Rights, ac-
cording to Dworkin, "are creatures of both history and morality: what
an individual is entitled to have . . depends upon both the practice
and the justice of. . .political institutions. '" 60 Dworkin thus concludes
that judges use evaluative, moral reasoning to discover preexisting
rights.6 I I will argue that this thesis presupposes a controversial episte-
mology and ontology.62
Dworkin's "rights thesis" is controversial. Counter examples dem-
onstrating that judges often base decisions in "hard" cases on policy
59 Id at 90. "Individuals have rights when ... a collective goal is not a sufficient justifi-
cation for denying them what they wish. . . ." Id at xi; cf id at 269. MacCormick, inciden-
tally, has reconstructed rights as "goods normatively secured to individuals." MacCormick,
Children's Rights: A Test Case for Theories of Right, 62 ARCHIVES FOR PHIL. OF LAW & SOC.
PHIL. 305 (1976). Dworkin has denied that we have a general right to liberty. See R. DWOR-
KIN, supra note 3, at 266-74. We have only the right to some specific, distinct liberties. "[T]he
difference between cases covered and those not covered by our supposed right to liberty [is
not] a matter of degree," because "the ordinary criminal code reduces choice for most men
more than laws which forbid fringe political activity." Id at 270. The central concept of
Dworkin's argument is "the concept not of liberty but of equality." Id at 272. He has pro-
posed-that "individual rights to distinct liberties must be recognized only when the funda-
mental right to treatment as an equal can be shown to require these rights." Id at 273-74.
These equality-based rights exist for Dworkin even when the democratic majority vote is
against them, because "democracy cannot discriminate, within the overall preferences imper-
fectly revealed by voting, distinct personal and external components, so as to provide a
method for enforcing the former while ignoring the latter." Id at 276. One of Dworkin's
central theses is that the government should pay attention to our personal preferences but
ignore external preferences. Id Preferences are personal if "they state a preference for the
assignment of one set of goods or opportunities" to the individual, and external if "they state
a preference for [the] assignment of goods or opportunities to others." Id at 275.
I strongly disagree with the thesis that equality constitutes the most fundamental right.
Freedom of speech, for example, may need to be defended against those who
would abridge or suppress it as dangerous to their prosperity, security, or
other personal interests. We cannot escape, as Dworkin's purported deriva-
tion of such rights from equality seeks to do, the assertions of the value of such
liberties as compared with advances in general welfare, however fairly as-
sessed.
It is in any case surely fantastic to suppose that what, for example, those
denied freedom of worship . ..have chiefly to complain about is not the
restriction of their liberty . . . but that they are not accorded equal concern
and respect . . . . [T]he word "equal" is playing an empty but misleading
role. . . .The evil is the denial of liberty or respect; not equal liberty or equal
respect ....
H.L.A. HART, Between Utility and Rights, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
ISAIAH BERLIN 77, 96-97 (A. Ryan ed. 1979). The importance attached to a given liberty is
the product of a reflective equilibrium of many individual and transpersonal values. This
reflective equilibrium must be acceptable within a given culture. Acceptability can be based
on a complex theory of rationality. A. PECZENIK, supra note 37, at 84-103.
60 R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 87.
61 But cf id at 293 ("[A] plaintiff has a certain legal right without supposing that any
rule or principle that already 'exists' provides that right."). This is a puzzle. If the right
already exists and if the judicial obligation to enforce the right already exists, does not the
principle that "describes" the right already exist as well?
62 See in/ra text accompanying notes 70-77.
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grounds instead of on rights and principles abound.63 The Swedish
Supreme Administrative Court ("Regeringsratten") relies on political
considerations when it decides the extent to which a municipality may
subsidize private enterprise.64 Dworkin replies that the counter exam-
ples are, in fact, arguments of principle, not of policy.
The difference between an argument of principle and an argument of
policy. . . is a difference between two kinds of questions that a polit-
ical institution might put to itself, not a difference in the kinds of facts
that can figure in an answer. If an argument is intended to answer
the question whether or not some party has a right to a political act or
decision, then the argument is an argument of principle, even though
the argument is thoroughly consequentialist in its detail. 65
The key to understanding Dworkin's theory lies in the phrase "questions
that a political institution might put to itself" and the word "intended."
Dworkin apparently says that regardless of what argument judges pres-
ent, their reasoning is based on what they presume or intend the princi-
ples to be. If they intend to discover rights, they discover rights.
A. Claims Based upon Conceptual Presuppositions versus
Justificatory Procedure
Dworkin assumes that legal justification zhr what the lawyers who
perform the analysis claim it is. They claim that certain rights and the
judicial obligation to enforce those rights exist before the judicial deci-
sion that recognizes their existence is made; both the rights and the judi-
cial obligation, therefore, did exist before the judge made his decision.
Analysis of the procedure of legal justification, however, leads to a differ-
ent conclusion.
1. Claims Revealed by Judicial Attitudes and Legal Concepts- Judicial
Decisions Reached by Appying Preexisting Law
Courts and authorities must follow the law, which essentially con-
sists of statutes, precedents, and other sources. Courts in many jurisdic-
tions, therefore, have a legal duty to base their reasoning upon legal
sources no matter how obscure.66 If a court decided a case with neither
explicit nor implicit references to preexisting sources of the law, then
most lawyers would not consider the thinking underlying the decision to
63 E.g., Greenawalt, Polic, Rzghts and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REV. 991, 991-99
(1977).
64 E.g., cases at RA 1975:44; RA 1972 C76; RA 1966:7; RA 1962:1; RA 1960:38; RA
1960:15; RA 1940:8. RA stands for "Regeringsrattens Arsbok," the Yearbook of the Supreme
Administrative Court of Sweden.
65 R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 297.
66 Cf A. PECZENIK, supra note 40, at 62-63. The most extreme example is the French
exegetical school, which believed that all legal questions can and ought to be answered on the
basis of enacted law. K. OLIVECRONA, LAW AS FAcT 35 (2d ed. 1971).
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be "legal."' 67 Moreover, judicial decisions enforce, and ought to enforce,
rights. Dworkin emphasizes the judicial function of enforcing preexist-
ing rights and deemphasizes the requirement that they follow the legal
sources. His theory, however, applies in principle to the lawyer's con-
ceptual presuppositions and claims.
2. Conclusions Based on Analysis of the Procedure of LegalJustification:
Judicial Decisions Are Not a Mere Application of Preexisting
Law
To establish, or discover, the law-particularly the content of rights
and the judicial duty to enforce those rights-and to justify decisions in
the "hard" cases, courts must both identify the applicable sources of law
and perform moral evaluations. Because of their evaluative role, one can-
not regard a court-s legaljustification as merely producing true or false descriptions
of legal sources. For the same reason, it is inaccurate to regard a court's
legal justification as merely true or false descriptions of how individuals
behave, what future courts will do, the content of established legal ideol-
ogy, the social acceptance of the law, or the historical or hypothetical
intent of the legislator.68 But can one regard any of these as true de-
scriptions of "the law" or of rights? The procedure of establishing
rights, judicial duties, and, generally speaking, the valid law, has a spe-
cial epistemological character. It presupposes a series of evaluative,
moral considerations corresponding to the three justificatory stages:
from the criteria of law to the law-character of a normative system; from
the normative system to the legal validity of definite sources of the law;
and from the sources to the determination of the content of legal rules
and principles. 69 Can evaluative thinking give the judge cognition of
the law?
Dworkin does not focus on the procedure of legal justification. In-
stead, he bases his conclusions on conceptual presuppositions and judi-
cial claims. Although many modern philosophers also emphasize claims
and presuppositions instead of procedures, in some cases, one cannot
take their assertions seriously. If, for example, a witch doctor gives a
patient herbs to exorcise a demon and the herbs cure him because they
happen to be bactericidal, the truth is that the bactericidal herbs cured
the patient, and not the driving out of the demon. The assumptions and
beliefs of the witch doctor and his patient do not matter because we
have independent proof that those presuppositions are wrong. Herbs
exist, demons do not. In other words, the method of presupposition is a
valuable tool for conceptual analysis, but its philosophical conclusions
67 Cf N. MACCORMICK, supra note 2, at 53.
68 Cf Aarnio, Alexy & Peczenik, supra note 21, at 430-34.
69 See supra notes 27-42 and accompanying text.
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must be checked by independent means, including among other things,
an examination of the justificatory procedure.
B. Epistemology and Ontology of Rights and Judicial Duties
According to Dworkin, an evaluative, reasoning process makes
judges cognizant of preexisting rights and of the preexisting judicial ob-
ligation to enforce those rights.70 This thesis presupposes a controversial
epistemology and a controversial ontology.
From the epistemological perspective, Dworkin's theory presup-
poses that cognition can be evaluati've. Dworkin, in other words, implies
that practical and evaluative, moral considerations can give us knowledge
about preexisting rights and judicial duties. Furthermore, his theory
presupposes the cognitivistic view that value statements-those, for ex-
ample, that reveal what rights we have-are true-or-false propositions,
not merely expressions of subjective attitudes. If, on the other hand, one
assumes that value statements are neither true nor false, one cannot con-
clude that legal justification simultaneously is evaluative and yields true
knowledge.
Another epistemological problem arises because Dworkin's theses
presuppose that the justifiability of knowledge depends on the knowing
subject's institutional position. Agreement on rights and judicial obliga-
tions in concrete cases is often impossible to reach. Judges may have one
view on this matter, while private individuals may have another. Ac-
cording to Dworkin, only the judge's view matters. But how can cogni-
tion of already existing objects depend solely upon whether the
cognizing individual is or is not an authorized judge?71
From an ontological perspective, the Dworkinian rights and judi-
cial duties are too complex. Some legal realists have written that even
rights clearly established by the legal sources-my right, for example, to
own my house--do not really exist, because the term "a right" is merely
a word that lacks semantic reference; it fails to denote anything real. 72
Whether unwritten rights in Dworkin's sense exist is even more doubt-
ful, because they are more complex and more controversial than the
clearly established legal rights. Their complexity is illustrated by exam-
ining their relationship with "collective goals," "sufficient reasons," "his-
tory," and "morality. 7 3  "Collective goals" presuppose complex
relations amongst individual goals. "Sufficient reasons" presuppose pre-
cise justifications of specific acts. "History" and "morality" are also
70 R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 87-88.
71 See also Munzer, Right Answer, Pre-existing Rights and Fairness, 11 GA. L. REv. 1055,
1060-65 (1977) (discussing point of "classifying rights as preexisting rather than newly
created').
72 A. Ross, supra note 30, at 174; see also K. OLIVERCRONA, supra note 66, at 177-81.
73 See supra text accompanying note 60.
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complex relational concepts. A "right" in Dworkin's sense thus presup-
poses complex relationships among many complex realtionships, some of
which involve values. Neither complexity nor involvement with values,
however, must preclude the existence of "rights."
Are Dworkin's "rights" so complex or so intertwined with values
that they are nonexistent? This ontological question defies a simple an-
swer because each ontology is, or presupposes, an uliderlying theory that
defines concepts such as "real" and "existence. ' 74 If the underlying the-
ory is based on common sense and ordinary language, it is usually
vague, and permits too many interpretations and too many ontological
consequences to arise. Among these ontological doctrines, at least two
must be considered. One is based on Hagerstrom's assumption that
what cannot be placed in time and space does not exist. Because pro-
positions concerning rights cannot be placed in time and space, they do
not exist. 5 The second admits institutional facts such as chess, money,
states, and rights, which can be defined only by reference to some under-
lying norm, such as chess rules or legal norms.76
Dworkin's theory of preexisting rights is clearly incompatible with
Hagerstrom's ontology. In fact, whether the ontology of institutional
facts is complex enough to grasp their mode of existence is open to
doubt. Preexisting rights are, after all, deemed to exist before the insti-
tutional sources of the law mention them. Dworkin, however, surpris-
ingly states that his "characterization of a right . . . does not suppose
that rights have some special metaphysical character . . . -77 Given
Dworkin's characterization, all the talk of preexisting rights and judicial
duties is only a metaphor with which Dworkin says only that judges claim
the preexistence of the rights and employ this claim in their reasoning;
whether the claim is true or false is another question. If, on the other
hand, Dworkin, despite his disavowal, really means that the claim is
true, that the rights and judicial duties do exist before the judicial deci-
sions, then he must admit that the rights are ontologically more complex
than brute facts in space and time.
Adopting an evaluative epistemology and complex ontology, in any
case, requires accepting a total philosophical system. Reasons concern-
74 W.V.O. QUINE, ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER ESSAYS 53-54 (1969); cf.
W.V.O. QUINE, FROM THE LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 19 (2d ed. 1961).
75 E.g., Hdgerstr6m, Selbsidarstellung, 7 DIE PHILOSOPHIE DER GEGENWART IN
SELBSTDARSTELLUNGEN 111-54 (R. Schmidt ed. 1929).
76 E.g., N. MACCORMICK, LAW AS INSTITUTIONAL FACTS 2-6 (1973); J. SEARLE,
SPEECH ACTS 50-53 (1969); Anscombe, On Brute Facts, 18 ANALYSIS 69, 69-72 (1958); Wein-
berger, Tatsachen und Tasachenbeschreibungen, in SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE ALS AUFKLXRUNG, FEST-
SCHRIFT FUR ERNST TOPITSCH 173-87 (1979).
However, the validity of the norms on which institutional facts depend might presuppose
some institutional facts; a problem thus arises of how to avoid a vicious circle.
77 R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at xi.
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ing a practice as special as legal justification alone cannot support evalu-
ative epistemology and complex ontology.
C. The Quasi-Cognitive Character and the Autonomy of Legal
Justification
The theory of legal justification presented here is different; it avoids
the epistemological and ontological difficulties inherent in Dworkin's
model. Legal justification has a quasi-cognitive character. It claims to be
a cognition of the law and in some cases it claims to be a cognition of
rights, but an examination of its procedure reveals that it is not purely
cognitive. Legal justification expresses an acceptable compromise be-
tween two distinguishable components. The first component is a true
scientific description of the sources of the law and, therefore, is a true
description of established evaluations. The second component is a con-
tinual process of creating new evaluations.78 The regulative idea of
truth undoubtedly governs the first component; the description should
be true, not false. Whether the regulative idea of truth governs the sec-
ond component is controversial. Cognitivists would argue that "evalu-
ating" means discovering the truth about objective values;
noncognitivists, however, would deny this assertion. Although I need
not rely on any cognitivist or noncognitivist assumptions, this theory of
legal justification would certainly be more attractive to noncognitivists
than cognitivists.
The practical difference between this theory and Dworkin's is that
Dworkin reduces legal justification to moral justification, while this the-
ory emphasizes the autonomy of legal justification. Individual judicial
decisions, as a rule, are justified only in a contextually sufficient manner.
The contextually sufficient justification is a compromise between
description and evaluation. Whether this compromise is right or wrong
from the viewpoint of deep justification remains to be seen. While the
description of the legal sources is deeply justifiable as an attempt to tell
the truth, the creation of evaluations is deeply justifiable as a means to
fulfill some demands of rationality and because it is so intertwined with
78 Cf. A. PECZENIK, supra note 40, at 206; A. PECZENIK, WARTOd NAUKOWA
DOGMATYKI PRAWA 72 (1966); Peczenik, Empirical Foundations of Legal Dogmatics, 12 LOGIQUE
ET ANALYSE 32, 43 (1969), reprinted in A. PECZENIK, ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 56 (1970);
Peczenik, Doctrinal Study of Law and Science, 17 OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR OFFEN-
TLICHES RECHT 127, 138 (1967), reprinted in A. PECZENIK, ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 36
(1970). This antinomy between the claim and the impossibility of fulfilling the claim is a
common feature of epistemological problems. We claim, for example, that our beliefs are
true, and the concept of knowledge presupposes this claim. We know, however, that we
might be wrong; our knowledge is never certainly true, but only justified or corroborated.
The juristic cognitive claims, on the other hand, are, for the reasons already discussed, even
more controversial than the general claim regarding truth of knowledge.
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our way of life.79 The compromise itself between description and evalu-
ation promotes the rule of law (Rechtssicherheit) which exists when le-
gal decisions are simultaneously predictable and morally acceptable.
The value of promoting the rule of law can be based on the "Hobbes-
ian" idea that it is morally preferable for a society to establish an institu-
tional legal order that sometimes leads to morally incorrect conclusions,
than to require society's actors to individually evaluate each of the com-
plex situations that arise in modern society. Because of human limita-
tions, the second alternative would lead to less consensus, less
rationality, less efficiency, and more violence. Consequentialist moral
reasoning thus justifies imposing limits on individual morality and fa-
vors institutionalized law.80 Accordingly, from this perspective, it is
morally good to establish the sources of the law. It is also morally good
to establish a legal discourse that expresses the compromise between ad-
hering to the sources and creating new moral evaluations. Finally, it is
morally good for a legal system to have authoritative judicial decisions
because not even the most satisfactory legal discourse can solve all social
conflicts.8' On its face, therefore, each legal norm, regardless of content,
is justified morally in the following weak sense: it belongs to an institu-
tional legal order, and any such order is, on its face, morally preferable
to no such order at all.
These reflections elucidate the sense of the important assumption
that, from the legal point of view,82 the norm ("N") ought to be ob-
served. This expression presupposes two conditions. First, it assumes
that one has performed a contextually sufficient legal justification of N,
in light of the legal transformational norms such as the source norms
and reasoning norms. Second, it presupposes that one can perform a
deep justification of N. Because he neglects the contextually sufficient
legal justification, Dworkin has not grasped the manner in which it
serves as a compromise between the description of legal sources and the
process of moral evaluation. As a result, Dworkin has not needed to
address the deep justification of this compromise and has failed to see
79 Cf A. PECZENIK, supra note 37, chs. 4, 5; Aarnio, Alexy & Peczenik, supra note 21, at
257-59.
80 Some reasons which are necessary to justify the moral obligation to observe norm N
may thus be omitted in the context of its legal justification. Cf. Peczenik, On the Nature and
Function of the Grundnorm, 2 RECHTSTHEORIE BEIHEFT 279, 286 (1981).
81 Cf Alexy, Die Idee einer Prozeduralen Theorie derJuristischen Argumentation, 2 RECHTSTHE-
ORIE BEIHE-r" 177, 186-87 (1981); Aarnio, Alexy & Peczenik, supra note 21, at 257, 273-76.
82 This concept of the legal point of view is stronger than Joseph Raz's. Raz has pointed
out that some "statements of legal rights and duties ...are detached, that is they do not
assert the existence of such rights or duties but only their existence from the legal point of
view." Raz, Legal Validity, 63 ARCHIVE FOR PHIL. OF LAW & SOC. PHIL. 339, 352 (1977).
Raz has also noted that "a detached [legal] statement does not carry the full normative force
of an ordinary normative statement. . . . I am not implying that lawyers. . . do not believe
in the validity (i.e., justification) of the law with which they deal. Only that often they do not
commit themselves to such beliefs when acting in their professional capacity." Id at 346.
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the very distinction between the contextually sufficient justification ex-
pressed in this compromise and the deep justification of this compromise.
Furthermore, he has not needed to describe the different forms this com-
promise takes at the three different stages of legal justification. Dwor-
kin's theory thus prevents one from seeing just how complex and how
important legal justification is.
D. Rights, Legal Tradition, and Judicial Discretion: A Digression
Up to this point, I have ignored the institutional component of
Dworkin's "rights thesis." In his opinion, if judges were not required to
discover the preexisting rights, they would be free to act contrary to
justice and to legislate retroactively.8 3 Dworkin would be correct if the
only alternative to his method of deep moral justification of judicial de-
cisions in "hard" cases was unrestricted judicial discretion. The theory
presented here, however, provides another alternative: the complex sys-
tem of the contextually sufficient and deep justifications in the law.
While it is true that judicial reasoning has the structure of "reflec-
tive equilibrium," among the components of this equilibrium are some
established source norms and reasoning norms8 4 that Dworkin's theory
more or less neglects. These norms concern the law-character of the
norm system, the sources of the law, and legal reasoning. Although
these norms do not eliminate the risks inherent in judicial discretion,
they do keep the risks within acceptable limits. The psychological influ-
ence of the claim that there are preexisting rights is, of course, also an
important factor.85 I have already stated that confidence in the tradi-
tional juristic source norms and reasoning norms promotes the rule of
law. Such confidence, in fact, promotes the rule of law more efficiently
than confidence in Dworkin's rights-oriented method.
III
THE RIGHT-ANSWER THEORY
Another important concept in Dworkin's theory is that the ques-
tion, what is the law on this issue, always has only one right answer.8
6
Dworkin "condemns the practice of making decisions that seem right in
isolation, but cannot be brought within some comprehensive theory of
general principles and policies that is consistent with other decisions also
thought right. '87 In his opinion, a judge should apply the "constructive
83 R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 87-90; cf MacCormick, Dworkin as Pre-Benthamit, 87
PHIL. REV. 585, 597, 601 (1978).
84 See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
85 Cf K. OLIVECRONA, supra note 66, at 135-40, 186-216.
86 R. DWORKIN,supra note 3, at 81, 272-90. Moreover, the judge never has discretion in
the strong sense; he always has a duty to decide the case one way rather than another. See id
at 31-35, 68-71.
87 Id at 87.
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model"; that is, he must accept precedents "as specifications for a princi-
ple that he must construct, out of a sense of responsibility for consistency
with what has gone before."88 Only Hercules could accomplish so
much. Yet, as MacCormick points out, Dworkin believes that "every
judge can and should try to get as close to Herculean competence as he
can." 89 Mackie explains the Herculean operation in the following
terms:
Some parts of the law in a certain jurisdiction are settled and rela-
tively uncontroversial, in the constitution or statutes or precedents.
Hercules uses these as data, seeking the theory, in terms of further
rights and principles, which best explains and justifies this settled law.
Having developed this theory, he then applies it to the hard case.9°
Dworkin believes that Hercules would, in theory if not in practice, al-
ways find the one right answer. He says that the probability of "a tie"--
a situation in which the reasons are perfectly balanced, thereby making
a single best answer theoretically impossible-is so low that it can be
ignored.9' This doctrine, however, is too simple.
Many legal concepts, "dispute," "reasons," and "justification," for
example, presuppose legal discourse. The concept of "discourse" presup-
poses opinions that are right or wrong. Because our concepts show that
a discourse on "hard" legal questions is possible, we assume that answers
to such questions are right or wrong. This assumption, necessary for a
meaningful legal discourse, is weaker, however, than Dworkin's right-an-
swer thesis. All we need in each legal case is the opportunity to ask
which, if any, solution is right. The answer may be strong (solution x is
right); weak (one of the solutions x I through xn is right, but one cannot
tell which one); relative (solution x is right from the point of view of a
given group of people, or in view of some reasoning norms); both weak
and relative; or negative (no solution is right).
One cannot think about legal matters without admitting the ques-
tion of a right answer, but one need not assume that a unique and abso-
lutely right answer exists. Without the question, moral and legal
discourse would be impossible, because if one does not argue that one's
views are morally or legally right, discourse has no purpose. In this
weak sense, all individuals, not only Hercules, possess the regulative idea
demanding that one shall look for the right answer. In a similar, but
stronger sense, the regulative concept of truth gives purpose to, among
others, scientists, who assume that a scientific proposition is either true
88 id at 161.
89 MacCormick, supra note 83, at 593; cf R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 105-23.
90 Mackie, supra note 25, at 4; Ef R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 105-23.
91 R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 286. Dworkin believes that the probability is so low
because "the legal system .. .is very advanced, and is thick with constitutional rules and
practices, and dense with precedents and statutes." Id
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or false.92
Although the presence of legal discourse presupposes an attempt to
ascertain the right answer, the procedure of legal discourse shows that
there are no effective mechanisms for ftnding the right answer to all
"hard" legal questions. An individual often arrives at what he considers
the best answer, given his perception at that point in time; he may also
claim that the answer is "intersubjectively" right.
The validity of his claim, however, depends on whether sufficient
criteria of acceptability for the answer are present. The sources of the
law, the traditional source norms, and reasoning norms provide some
criteria, but these criteria are not perfect. Several factors explain, in
part, why two judges do not always reach the same "right" answer.
First, ordinary language is vague, ambiguous, and evaluatively open.
The concepts that two different judges use might differ.
Second, legal justification presupposes nondeductive justificatory
stages. It presupposes the sequence of arguments from establishing the
law-character of a norm system, through recognizing the sources of the
law that are valid in this system, to concluding what the content of the
law should be. At each stage, both established criteria ("pedigree") and
moral considerations are relevant. If the "pedigree" are viewed as prem-
ises of legal justification, moral considerations reveal that the sequence
from establishing the law-character of the norm system to determining
the content of the law is not deductive. The sequence, in other words,
contains justificatory 'jumps. '93 Although difficult to verify, one rea-
92 Cf A. PECZENIK, supra note 37, at 93-95, 99; R. ALEXY, supra note 36, at 165-68, 264-
68.
93 A justificatory "jump," or a transformation, occurs from p to q if, and only if, the
following conditions are fulfilled: (1) truth (or validity) ofp is proffered as a sufficient reason
for affirming q; and (2) p does not deductively entail q. See Aarnio,.Alexy & Peczenik, supra
note 21, at 136-58; ef A. PECZENIK, supra note 37, at 3-4, 70-73; Peczenik, Mon-Equivalent
Transformations and the Law, RECHTSTHEORIE BEIHEFT 1, 163-76 (1979). In this article, I can
only present a few of the main points of the complex theory ofjustificatory "jumps." Human
knowledge and justified evaluations are often based on 'jumps". The 'jump" from proposi-
tions about individual facts to general theories is an example. Legal justification involves, not
only the ordinary 'jumps," but also specific "jumps" resulting from mutual adaptation of
description and moral evaluation.
Not only are there regularly repeated acts of transformation, but there are also trans-
formational norms, that is, material-inference norms. Cf S. TOULMIN, THE UsEs OF ARGUMENT
98, 109-13 (1976). Material-inference norms are not analytical, so they cannot be justified
solely on logical grounds and postulates of the legal language. The transformational norm for
the justificatory 'jump" into the law, that is, the 'jump" from the (insufficient) criteria of law
to a conclusion about the law-character of a normative system can be expressed as follows: If
a number of social facts exist and certain normative, evaluative requirements are fulfilled,
then the normative system N is a legal system. This transformational norm justifies the great
step from a set of facts and a nonlegal "ought" (Sollen) to a legal "ought." The source norms
and other reasoning norms are also transformational norms for two justificatory "jumps" in-
side the law: namely, the source transformation and the legal-norm transformation. None of
these are analytic sensu stricto, but if one simultaneously refuted many of such norms and still
tried to perform a legal justification, he would have to either think incoherently or change
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sonably may hypothesize that the greater the number of nondeductive
"jumps" in an inference process, the less certain are its conclusions.
Third, more than one right political ideology exists. Legal reasoning
is "dense" not only with precedents, but also with competing ideologies.
When each ideology suggests a different interpretation of precedents,
which interpretation is best?94 MacCormick states that
this is not a matter which can be decided in a theory-independent
way, nor can the [subsequent] question which is really best among the
theories which people think best be answered in a theory-independent
way. . . . Hercules can finish his job only at the far end of an infi-
nite regress[ion]. 95
Because legal and political matters often are intertwined in "hard"
cases, a liberal judge might find one right answer, a conservative judge
another.
Fourth, moral discourse is based upon a balancing of considerations
that constitute a "reflective equilibrium. '96 The balance, however, can-
not be expressed convincingly in a precise priority order of values that is
valid for all situations. Priority orders have limited and changing
spheres of application. They are "heterarchies," irreducibly ad hoc, not
hierarchies.9 7 The "reflective equilibrium" of general and individual
many of the legal concepts he uses. The concepts "valid law" and "the legal ought" are
related to established transformational norms and to ad hoc transformational norms, concern-
ing (a) the law-character of a norm system, (b) the sources of the law, and (c) the content of
legal norms. Some of these conceptual relations are logically necessary, while some are de-
tectable only through justificatory "jumps."
Some logicians have proposed the thesis that if a transformational norm regulates the
justificatory step in question, there is no "jump." I disagree. A corresponding premise might
replace a transformational norm. See E. NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE 138 (1961).
In this manner justificatory "jumps" are formally converted into logical deductions. From
thejustifcatoy perspective, however, the "jump" remains because, among other reasons, the
conclusion of legal reasoning is often more acceptable than the premise, or transformational
norm, supporting it. By constructing alternative sets of ad hoc premises or transformational
norms of this kind, one can formally eliminate a "jump." When these alternative sets are
mutually inconsistent, one may or may not be able to construct a nonarbitrary priority order.
One can support a given construction of a statute, for example, by adding premises about
either the "intent" of the legislator or about the statute's consequences. Adding premises
whichformally eliminate "jumps" creates some logical problems; a formal method solves these.
See C. Alchourron & D. Makinson, On the Logic of a Theo,7 Change: Contraction Functions and
Their Associated Revision Functions, 58 THEORIA 14 (1982).
94 Oker-Blom has pointed out that Dworkin's choice of the internal (judicial) point of
view made the theory of a right answer plausible. See Oker-Blom, supra note 21, at 306, 312.
Many of his critics, however, choose the external viewpoint of a commentator on the legal-
reasoning process. The internal viewpont, in my opinion, is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition of correctness of Dworkin's theory.
95 See MacCormick,supra note 83, at 596. Seegenerally N. MACCORMICK,supra note 2, at
254-55.
96 See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20 (1973).
97 Cf H.N. CASTANEDA, THINKING AND DOING 303 (1974) ("mostly unknown motiva-
tional hierarchy"); Heather, Legal Structures for Law Machines, 1 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
AND LEGAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 117, 121-26 (C. Ciampi ed. 1983) ("heterarchies").
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moral considerations is, to a degree, also ad hoc. One can advocate,
therefore, general value propositions and norms by demonstrating that
individual evaluations support them, and one can advocate individual
evaluations by demonstrating their consistency with the general ones. If
consistency is nonexistent, it is sometimes easier to modify an individual
evaluation and sometimes easier to modify the general value proposi-
tions and norms. Similarly, in science, concrete data and individual the-
ories also adapt to each other. Scientific paradigms, however, replace
each other, while moral "paradigms" do not. Instead, they compete and
coexist during long historical periods. Moreover, if counterexamples are
avoided, one's moral "theory" tends to be imprecise; one's moral theory
becomes, in fact, so imprecise that the individual does not know in ad-
vance when he must switch from one moral "theory" to another.98 Be-
cause legal and moral matters are intertwined in "hard" cases, the legal
justification inherits the ad hoc quality of moral justification, regardless
of the existence of legal sources that confer relatively greater certainty.
Consequently, different individuals at different times have different cri-
teria of rightness.
Fifth, nothing in the moral sphere appears as certain as some theo-
retical certainties. (We can assume, for example, that one who denies
that he is alive is even less sane than a person who denies that one ought
not to kill.) Consequently, when the legal justification is intertwined
with the moral one, it is not expected to be as certain as in the natural
sciences.
Sixth, the class of factors relevant to the determination of the right
answer to moral and legal questions is undefinable. Neither the class of
relevant moral reasons nor the class of the sources of the law which may
be used in the legal justification is precisely defined.
Seventh, the reasons for and against a given answer might be in-
commensurable. Even within a single ideology, "a single scale of mea-
surable values" is unavailable. "[E]valuation," for example, "involves
multipl e criteria, which must include at least 'justice,' 'common sense,'
'public policy,' and 'legal expendiency.' 99
[Dworkin's] argument assumes too simple a metric for the strength of
considerations, that such strengths are always commensurable on a
linear scale, so that the strength of the case for one side must be either
greater than that of the case for the other side, or less, or else they
must be equal in the sense of being so finely balanced that even the
slightest additional force on either side would make it the stronger.
98 See also Nowell-Smith, A Theoy ofJustice?, 3 PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 315,
316 (1973) ("The Aristotelian approach starts with the premise... that the world in which
we act is a world of 'things capable of being otherwise than they are' . In this untidy
world . . .universal knowledge . .. is not to be had. . ").
99 N. MACCORMICK, supra note 2, at 252-53 (emphasis added); cf. MacCormick, supra
note 83, at 588.
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But in fact considerations may be imperfectly commensurable, so that
neither of the opposing cases is stronger than the other, and yet they
are not finely balanced.' 00
One must weigh the relevant factors against each other. The result of
weighing a pair of factors depends on an everchanging influence of an
indefinite number of other factors. The weighing of the plaintiff's and the
defendant's rights in torts, for example, might depend on economic and
social considerations. The result might also depend on the order in which
the parties make their presentations. Finally, the result might depend
on consequentialistic considerations regarding the future effects of the de-
cision. The uncertainty of the future, however, creates more uncertainty
when weighing morally and legally relevant factors.' 1
Eighth, legal histog shows that the best answers, and indeed the best
interpretative methods, change with time. This implies that a "right"
answer on Friday may be wrong the following Monday.
Many legal concepts, in short, presuppose that one should search
for "one right answer" in "hard" cases, but they do not presuppose that
one can find it. But can one still say that there is only one right answer,
even if nobody can find it? (Does not science, for example, assume that
only one answer to all questions is true, even if it is impossible to deter-
mine?) If so, the whole controversy is metaphysical and cannot be defini-
tively solved, either through analysis of legal concepts or a theory of
legal justificatory procedures. We assume that only one answer to de-
scriptive (theoretical or scientific) questions is true and, in my opinion,
we must assume that the true answer corresponds to the actual, real
world. Does Dworkin's assumption of the right answer to all legal ques-
tions imply that the right answer corresponds to actual (real and preex-
isting) rights? If so, I disagree because this view implies a controversial
ontology. 0 2 It seems more natural to assume that the claim of objectiv-
ity has less force in moral than in theoretical matters. The uncertainty
inherent in the procedure of finding the right answer is not accidental.
Philosophical analysis of the expression "the right answer to moral or
legal questions" demonstrates that the right answer is the acceptable an-
swer; we cannot imagine what else the right answer could be.. The no-
tion of acceptability, however, depends upon individual norms:
acceptable means acceptable to someone, and different groups of people,
and different people within these groups, may have different standards
of acceptability. 10 3 Judges, for example, certainly argue for the answer
100 Mackie, supra note 25, at 9.
lt R. Hilpinen, Normative Conflicts and Legal Reasoning (1982) (unpublished manu-
script; can be obtained from author at Turun Yliopisto, SF 20500 Turku, Finland).
102 See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
103 Aarnio, On Truth and the Acceptability of Interpretative Propositions in Legal Dogmatics, 2
RECHTSTHEORIE BEIHEFT 33 (1981).
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they think the best.' 0 4 Although judges may believe that they discover
this answer, in fact, they "legislate"; 0 5 they choose one of many equally
justifiable alternative answers. Because Dworkin has not shown that all
people share the same standards of acceptability, he has not shown that
there is only one right answer to any legal question. While a right an-
swer may exist in some cases, in others, many alternative answers are
equally right. Only our form of life limits the variety of right
answers. 106
CONCLUSION
Dworkin's theory is too simple from the jurisprudential viewpoint
and too controversial from the philosophical viewpoint. From the per-
spective of jurisprudence, Dworkin fails to appreciate the importance of
the distinction between the contextually sufficient and the deep legal
justifications. Consequently, he overlooks the complexity of the former.
In particular, Dworkin fails to realize that the contextually sufficient
justification represents a compromise between the description of the le-
gal sources and moral evaluation; the compromise is made at each of the
three different stages of justificatory procedure. Moreover, Dworkin
overemphasizes the importance of moral rights and neglects the impor-
tance of institutionalized laws.
From the philosophical perspective, Dworkin's theory is based on
an oversimplified analysis of claims that concepts such as "legal justifica-
tion" presuppose. Instead of merely claiming that legal justification pre-
supposes the question, what is the right answer, he claims that it
presupposes the existence of the right answer. Dworkin concludes that
one right answer exists. Dworkin must, therefore, adopt the assumption
of value-objectivism and, implicitly, a controversial ontology of rights.
104 R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 282.
105 Mackie, supra note 25, at 7.
106 A. AARNIO, ON LEGAL REASONING 126-29 (1977) (Wittgenstein's concept introduced
to legal theory).
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